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GOING OUT ON A LIMB:
PROSTHETICS, NORMALCY AND
DISPUTING
THE
THERAPY/
ENHANCEMENT DISTINCTION
ISABEL KARPIN AND ROXANNE MYKITIUK*

I. INTRODUCTION
The development of genetic technologies, nano-technologies and
technologies

related

to

artificial

intelligence

have

provoked

discussion about the different uses to which they may be put; namely,
their potential for therapeutic and non-therapeutic use. Resisting
claims that individuals should be free to use these technologies as
they see fit to alter their own physical, psychological and intellectual
capacities, lifespan and morphologies or those of their existing or
future children, some authors

contend

that

both

ethical

and

regulatory limits should be placed on this exercise of free choice.1
A

number

of

academics

have

suggested

therapy/enhancement distinction can perform both

that

the

moral

and

regulatory work in assisting us with resolving the tricky issue of
which uses of these technologies to permit and which to discourage or
ban.2 In this article, we examine how therapy and enhancement are
characteristically understood in ethical, medical and legal contexts, and
how these understandings rely on unstated assumptions about the
meanings attributed to different forms of embodiment: normal and

disabled, healthy and diseased, able-bodied and impaired, and
beautiful and functional. We argue, consistent with feminist and
disability studies critiques, that the idea of a ‘normal’ body as a
benchmark against which other bodies are judged is unsustainable
despite observing that ‘the closer corporeality approximates to a
socio-culturally variant position of normativity the more acceptable
it becomes’.3 We track the way in which bodies (within medico-legal
and biotechnological discourses) are regulated and managed in
relation to shifting normative ideals. This exploration leads us to
conclude that the therapy/enhancement distinction is inadequate and
unhelpful to guide ethical analysis and medical and regulatory
decision making, and cannot adequately assist us in adjudicating
when it is appropriate to allow individual choice and autonomy to
govern the use of these technologies and when the State should
intervene.
In the first part of this article, we critically examine the meaning of
enhancement and therapy and draw on feminist and disability studies
critiques of normalcy to put pressure on the viability of the distinction.
Conventionally, therapeutic interventions are understood to restore or
bring an individual’s morphology and capacities within the normal
range, while enhancements imply going beyond that which is normal.
The concept of ‘normal’ embodiment is the fulcrum upon which the
therapy/enhancement distinction rests and from which it derives its
purchase. Moreover, normatively, the idea of ‘normal’ or ‘normalcy’

sets the standard around which bodies are evaluated, regulated and
are even permitted to materialise. However, as we argue below,
what is ‘normal’ is ‘not only being superceded in practice, but has been
unstable

all

along’4 and

is

thus

unable

to

support

the

therapy/enhancement distinction that rests upon it. While exposing the
fallacy of normalcy, we also come to understand that enhancement is a
paradox. In its promise of something better, it renders those of us at
the base line in a state of inadequacy.
Next, we focus on the idea of prosthesis as offering restoration and
also as an ‘add-on’. It is the perfect vehicle for deeper exploration of
the therapy/enhancement distinction because restoration can never be
complete if an add-on is always available to make us better. Using
prosthesis as a model, we suggest that the ‘normal’ body is a theoretical
construct dependent upon social and historical contexts.
Finally, using the example of the regulation of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD), we demonstrate how laws that prohibit or
limit the use of PGD for enhancement purposes and facilitate
therapeutic uses of the technology cannot be characterised nor
justified on the basis of this distinction. Legal rules based on ideas
of ‘normal’ embodiment are, in fact, normative, constructing
both a departure from and congruence with ideas about the
normal/normative. In so doing, certain types of embodiment are
elevated as self-evidently desirable while other forms of embodiment,
what we might call anomalous, deviant or even disabled, are made

preemptively undesirable.5

II. THERAPY, ENHANCEMENT AND NORMALCY
A. What Is Enhancement and What Is Therapy?
In 2003, the US President’s Council on Bioethics examined the
therapy/enhancement distinction in its report Beyond Therapy:
Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness.6 In a description
offered (but in fact not explicitly relied upon by the Council), we
are

told

that

therapy

understood

in

the

context

of

the

therapy/enhancement, distinction, and:
as in common understanding, is the use of biotechnical power to treat
individuals with known diseases, disabilities, or impairments in an
attempt to restore them to a normal state of health and fitness.7
Enhancement is described as:
the directed use of biotechnical power to alter, by direct intervention,
not disease processes but the ‘normal’ workings of the human body
and psyche, to augment or improve their native capacities and
performances.8
The report goes on to state:
Those who introduced this distinction hoped by this means to
distinguish

between

the

acceptable

and

the

dubious

or

unacceptable uses of biomedical technology: therapy is always
ethically fine, enhancement is, at least prima facie, ethically

suspect.9
However, the term enhancement is highly problematic. Does it mean
‘more’ or ‘better’ and, if ‘better’, by what standards? If ‘enhancement’
is defined in opposition to ‘therapy,’ what do ‘healthy’ and ‘impaired’,
‘diseased’, ‘disabled’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ and ‘super-normal’ all
mean? And what about the meaning of ‘therapy’ or ‘treatment’? Does
it mean preserving or restoring someone to a standard of

species

typical normal functioning as is often suggested,10 and if so, can the
norm be equated with the average? As the President’s Council asks:
‘[i]s it therapy to give growth hormone to a genetic dwarf, but not to
a short fellow who is just unhappy to be short?’11 Moreover, does
treatment include aesthetic modifications and if so to what extent?12
Must such modification be limited to ‘normalisation’ rather than
beautification? Does therapy include modification for the purposes of
adjusting the body to suit the social environment whether or not
that has the outcome of species typicality? The use of high-tech
prostheses by double amputees that enable them to run fast is an
example of this kind of intervention. We will return to this example
below.
As Kerry Taylor and Roxanne Mykitiuk have written:
The ‘normal’ is perceived to be an objective way to think about
human beings, a means to represent or quantify ‘what is’ on the
basis of statistical averages. However, the ‘normal’ also contains

often opaque and unquestioned value judgments, and is used to
represent what is right, and desirable. [. . .] ‘Normalcy’ is used
to rationalize medical attempts to eradicate our differences, and
to render all bodies alike – healthy and interchangeable – as
sameness is perceived to be the foundation of equality.13
The effect of this is to secure the social positioning of the disabled as
abnormal and deviant rather than simply different.14 Scully and
Rehmann-Sutter suggest that this exclusion from the normal may also
result in a classification that places the person ‘outside the category of
being naturally human’.15 However, as we discuss below, the categories
‘normal’ and ‘disabled’ are

problematised and confounded when

having a disability is simultaneously construed as enabling or giving
effect to a ‘superability’. Parents of children with autism or Williams
Syndrome, for instance, have argued that their children have both
extraordinary capacities and incapacities at the same time.16
The therapy/enhancement distinction is clearly problematic. The
concept of enhancement pre-supposes too many certainties about the
so-called normal state beyond which it would or should be wrong to
journey, while the concept of therapy embraces a standard of health
and embodiedness that insists that those who do not meet it should
desire to meet it, and need to meet it. The underlying assumption
built into the therapy/enhancement distinction, that there are universal
ideas of acceptable or desirable embodiment that must be interrogated.
In order to challenge claims about what is and is not normative

embodiment for the purposes of legitimating treatment or proscribing
enhancement, we focus specifically on how understandings of disability
and anomalous embodiment17 complicate the very basis of the
distinction. Our aim here is to wrestle with assertions about what
constitutes a deficiency and what constitutes an improvement.

B. How Does the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction Guide
Ethical Analysis?
In his article ‘NBIC, NGO’s and the three types of disabled people’,18
Gregor Wolbring describes three categories of disabled people. The
first is the patient type who wishes to be fixed to the norm and sees
his or her own biological reality as a defect, for whom medical care,
rehabilitation

and

technological

devices—including

prosthetic devices—offer a fix towards or

up to

assistive

or

the norm. The

second is the transhumanist19 type who ‘sees their own body, as
well as the ‘normal’ human body as a ‘defect’ in need of not just
fixing to the norm but in need of augmentations above the norm with
the addition of new abilities’ facilitated by the use of new
technologies.20 Finally, there is the social justice type who uses
technology to change the physical environment or to change the
interaction with the physical environment. In this model:
[d]isability is not seen as an attribute of an individual, but rather a
complex collection of conditions, many of which are created by the

[social] environment. . . and socially mediated aspects of the
physical environment. . .[This] model of disability does not negate
that

a disabled person has a certain biological reality (like

having no legs), which

makes

her/him different in

her/his

abilities, which make her/him not fit the norm. But it views the
‘need to fit a norm’ as the disability and questions whether
many

deviations from the norm need a medical solution

(adherence to the norm) or a social solution (change/elimination
of norm).21
While Wolbring has separated out those who seek to adjust their
embodiment in line with technological opportunities from those who
challenge the need to fit the norm, we suggest that the line between these
categories is, in fact, fluid. For instance, one might want both prosthetic
devices and alterations to the social environment. It is quite possible
that an individual’s desire to use prosthetics has nothing to do with fixing a
‘defect’ in his or her body and nothing to do with enhancement beyond
the ‘norm’, but is rather about facilitating another way of being in
the world. Recent scholarly debates about prosthetics are useful in
helping us better understand the dynamics among the body, disability
and technology and their relationship to normative evaluations about
therapy and enhancement. By using the example of prosthesis, we show
how regulation that is based on the possibility of a complete self
towards which we might strive and beyond which we should not wish

to go, fails to understand the prosthetic nature of all embodiment.
If embodiment is always variable, then we need to come up with
different ethical and legal justifications for regulating some uses of
technologies and not others.

III. PROSTHESIS, DISABILITY AND SUPER-ABILITY
A. Prosthetising the Body
Disability scholars Mitchell and Snyder state that ‘a body deemed
lacking,

unfunctional,

or

inappropriately

functional

needs

compensation, and prosthesis helps to effect this end’.22 Understood
in this way, prosthesis is an addition or supplement to the body—
one that aims to restore wholeness to a body that is otherwise
incomplete and abnormal. Prosthetics replace, or fill in for, something
that is missing, and in their presence remind us of what is absent
from that body.23 Through the use of prosthetics, an attempt is made
to normalise the individual and deviant body so that, to the extent
possible, it functions and looks like a ‘normal’ body.
However, Lennard Davis argues

that the conceptualisation of

the

body as deficient does not necessitate its improvement. Rather,
according to Davis, there is always and only a ‘partial, incomplete
subject whose realization is not autonomy and independence but
dependency and interdependence’.24 Davis suggests that a normal body
is a theoretical construct and not a material reality. The norm is an

idealised quantitative and qualitative measure that is divorced from
(rather than derived from) the observation of bodies, which are
inherently variable. Moreover, as Wills contends, ‘the prosthetic body
will not be an exception but the paradigm for the body itself’ 25 as we
all attempt to shape, modify and contort our material flesh and blood
bodies to fit the theoretical and idealised norm. But, the norm itself is
not static, nor are the quantitative and qualitative dimensions used to
establish the norm. That which is theoretical, abstract and idealised
(the norm as opposed to the material body) is a shifting baseline
around which distinctions about therapy and enhancement in relation to
material bodies are made. As none of us has a normative body (one that
corresponds to a ‘universalised template of how corporeality should
appear’),26 it is necessary to critique the standard of normalcy situating
it within a shifting social and historical context where the meanings of
bodies both in their material and conceptual form are constantly
refigured. As Margrit Shildrick suggests:
[t]he claim that there might be a body, any body, that is not
modified is surely implausible. Bodies are not static givens, nor do
they settle,

but

rather

emerge

in

both

continuous

and

discontinuous process.27
Nevertheless, she agrees that there is the ‘force of socio-cultural and
psychic investments in promoting a universalised template of how
corporeality should appear’.28

The idea of the prosthetic is particularly useful here if we consider it
not only in its conventional sense of replacing or restoring that which is
missing, but as a means to facilitate ways of being that can be more or
less in accordance with social norms and conventions. Returning to
Wolbring’s typology of the relationship between disabled persons and
technology, in our view, both the patient and transhumanist types
illustrate the contradictions and contingencies of the regime of
normalcy as individuals seek to modify themselves with and through
technology in line with a base line that is itself constantly shifting over
time as individuals continuously strive to achieve or surpass it. While
Wolbring seems to suggest that only uses of technology that alter the
physical environment and not the person can offer an antidote to the
oppressive practices of normalising (and enhancing), we question
whether (all) uses of prosthetic technology must be viewed as
enforcing normalcy. Rather, consistent with the social model of
disability, a critique of the therapy/ enhancement distinction would
suggest that not all uses of prosthetics are aimed at modelling the body
in accordance with the norm or normative body. If the appropriate
response to disability resides in altering the environment writ large,
and eliminating oppression on the basis of difference, then a
technological/prosthetic alteration of the body, in a social context
where such environmental alterations are also made, need not
constitute therapy or enhancement.
Davis observes ‘what is universal in life if there are universals, is the

experience of the limitations of the body’.29 We are all incomplete
and disabled, requiring technological alterations and interventions to
our environments and ourselves, and involvement by way of social
policies and regulations to enable us. Unlike the transhumanist dystopia
imagined by Wolbring, whereby the incomplete body is always regarded
as negative and in need of improvement, Davis’ incomplete subject is the
ideal subject and the complete subject an unattainable fantasy that does
harm to our sense of self. That being the case, prosthesis becomes one of
a panoply of options that facilitates being in a body and being in a
world, along with social and legal interventions which

determine

where value lies and the conditions within which what is valued can
be distributed. Using the example of prosthesis both in its material
and metaphorical sense, we suggest that what is problematic is not the
possibility of bodily modification, but the policing through regulatory
regimes of a

normative

embodiment that reflects some

average human functioning or that accords with specific

kind

of

oppressive

ideals about appropriate aesthetic and physical manifestations and
expressions.
Wolbring describes, by way of example, several ways to think of a
person without legs rather than as disabled:

Let’s take a look at a – so called – ‘disabled person’ without legs.
If he/she sees him/herself as a defect in need of legs he/she sees
him/herself as a – so called – medical problem in need of fixing.

Furthermore if he/she sees the concept of legs as they are as
outdated and deficient and therefore tries to add on mobility
devices to their body which makes him/her much more capable
in his/her mobility than mere biological legs could provide with
that self-understanding this person will of course support everyone
and everything offering him/her this augmentation. However
what if that person sees themselves as just fine in his/her
biological reality and their different mode of movement? What if
that person wants to have a societal cure meaning the fixing of
society meaning that society starts to support their way of
movement (wheelchair, crawling. . .)?30

Wolbring’s rereading of physical anomaly as something other than
disability requires a further rethinking of not just disability but
enhancement too. In Wolbring’s account of the ways to think about
a person without legs, he includes the transhumanist model that he has
outlined earlier. It is worth considering Wolbring’s decision to use the
language of “transhumanism” in his analysis since we would argue
that the kind of transhumanists to whom he refers wrongly presuppose
a stable state of the human and human embodiment that have come
before.31 The perception that one’s limbs are outdated and deficient
because they are ‘mere biological legs’ suggests that the starting point
for an analysis of treatment versus enhancement is constantly shifting
and depends very much on the way in which the body is

constructed.

Contemporary

enhancement

technologies,

in

the

transhumanist model, are described as allowing us to be more than,
or beyond, human.32 However, if we view the human state as
always incomplete then technologies that might be attached to
the human can be understood as part of a panoply of social
goods and ills that we might have access to and that need to be
distributed justly or not at all. This is not to suggest that technological
alterations to the body should be preferred over those made to the
geographical and social environments, but that we must not concede the
meaning of such bodily alterations to those sympathetic to
transhumanist ideology.

B. Proselytising Prosthetics?
Histories of disability reveal the way in which attitudes towards people
with, and the meanings ascribed to, anomalous bodies are contingent on
broader cultural, economic and social factors. When we are forced to
confront the positive alignment of anomalous embodiment with
achievement and when this is done not by rendering the anomalies
invisible but rather by emphasising their existence, the undesirability
of that difference is profoundly challenged. It is not simply that this
results in a sympathetic response to anomalous embodiment but more
radically that it subverts the account of anomalies as disabling.
Indeed, in some instances, disability has been recast as enhancement.
This is not to question the very material and real consequences of

living with a disability in a world that is not organised around that
bodily difference, but to question the notion that in supplementing the
aberrant body, the aim of prosthetics qua prosthetics is to keep the
individual within the ‘normal’ range.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson scrutinises ‘the intersections between
the politics of appearance and the medicalisation of subjugated
bodies’33 in order to unpack the categories of disability and normalcy.
She provides a schema of disability with four aspects:

[f]irst, it is a system for interpreting and disciplining bodily
variations; second, it is a relationship between bodies and their
environments; third it is a set of practices that produce both the
able-bodied and the disabled; fourth it is a way of describing
the inherent instability of the embodied self.34

Each of these form part of a system in which the ‘fantasy of the body
as a neutral, compliant instrument of some transcendent will’35 is
radically challenged. Returning to the problematic of the prosthesis,
it is Garland-Thomson’s account of the work of fashion model, elite
athlete and double-amputee Aimee Mullins that is most illustrative for
our purposes. Garland-Thomson argues that the juxtaposition of
Mullins’s disabled body with the discourse of fashion represents an
irruptive moment where ‘as legless and beautiful she is an embodied
paradox asserting an inherently disruptive potential’.36 Born without
fibulae, Mullins’ parents made the decision to have her legs amputated

below the knee when she was a baby and by doing so, to enable mobility
through prosthetic limbs. Mullins uses a variety of prosthetic legs
depending on the context. For instance, for fashion shoots she wears
legs like those of a Barbie doll, not only long and slender, but fixed in
a position to wear high heels. As an elite runner and when competing
in races, Mullins wears titanium legs that are specially designed for
this purpose. These legs, based on cheetah legs, bear little resemblance
to

natural

human

legs.

As

Garland-Thomson

argues,

the

spectacularisation of disability in such contexts subverts normative
responses to disability as disabling. This is not to suggest that
corporeal variation is fabricated, but rather that the meaning of that
variation

is

contingent

upon

culturally

produced

systems

of

understanding of the self.
Garland-Thomson describes the case of disabled fashion modelling as
an activist cultural practice that is potentially transformative because the
body on display is marked by a highly visible disability. Taking the first
of Garland-Thomson’s four aspects of disability, rather than
disciplining bodily variations in this instance, disability invokes an
inherently disruptive potential that enables disability to be read as
fashion. Aimee Mullins has posed in her running legs and her
cosmetic legs for fashion houses such as Gucci and fashion
magazines such as Dazed and Confused. While Garland-Thomson
is impressed by Mullins’s refusal to cover up or smooth over the
joints where her artificial legs meet her flesh, and cites

their

appearance as a disruptive moment, there is, of course, a sense in
which what is being referenced is the already existing and sexist
requirement that women live up to ideals of beauty that are only
realisable in plastic. Indeed, the reference to the doll or the
mannequin is quite deliberate. This then draws out the second
aspect of Garland-Thomson’s schema, the relationship between
bodies

and

their

environments.

Mullins

operates

within

the

discourse of contemporary values and social oppressions. Marquard
Smith argues, for instance, that Mullins is ‘sexualized as an able-bodied
woman who just happens to be an amputee’.37 He goes on: ‘[a]t best her
status

as

an

amputee

must

be

acknowledged

and

disavowed

simultaneously’.38 While these discourses of sexist objectification do
permeate

the

Mullins

photo

shoot,

at

the

same

time

the

representation of disability as undesirable or needing repair is
challenged. Mullins’s more recent appearance in glass legs for the
final episode of the movie Cremaster by Matthew Barney is a further
play with the idea of prosthesis. These legs simultaneously fill the gap
where her ‘real’ legs would be (making her whole) while in their
transparency, exposing that very absence.39
In an advertisement for a UK internet company ‘Freeserve’ featuring
Aimee Mullins as a fashion model on the catwalk, the relationship
between normalcy, disability, bodily modification and enhancement is
further interrogated in the narrative frame of an able-bodied young
girl (approximately 8 years old). The advertisement begins with the

little girl on the catwalk asking: ‘What do I like about Aimee? Let’s
see. She likes to run, like me. There is a lot of things that we have in
common’. These words are interspersed with images of
scene preparations for the fashion show that include

behind

the

parade

of

a

weird and fantastical characters. Aimee Mullins parades down the
catwalk in runners, her cosmetic legs and finally her athletic legs.
The advertisement ends with the little girl and Aimee sitting

on

the

catwalk after the show in conversation. The girl turns to Mullins and
says ‘I mean you’re free to be who you want to be’ to which Aimee
nods. The final shot of the advertisement—first a view of Mullins
from the waist down sitting in a chair, wearing her cheetah legs, then a
shot of her face has Aimee saying ‘it’s a total feeling of accomplishment’
before fading to black and projecting the company’s name. Through this
advertisement

we

see

a complete

inversion

of

normalcy

and

accomplishment. It starts with the little girl insisting on her
commonality with Aimee and ends by insisting on difference as a state
of accomplishment and freedom. The shocking suggestion that this
able-bodied

girl

might

indeed

want

to

be

Aimee

Mullins,

amputations and all, is inevitable and in this way our notions of what
it is to be disabled and what it is to be enhanced are thrown into
radical doubt. Indeed, the advertisement reverses the typical liberal
humanist response of pity and worthy regard and borrows, instead,
from discourses of triumphalism and heroism; because it neither fully
occupies either discourse, it troubles

both. While much of the

material experience of embodiment by both the so-called abled and
disabled is of the order of the everyday; going to the shops, doing a
job, hanging out with friends and does not involve being a super
model or running in the Olympics, the power of these subversive
representational

discourses

and

their

mainstream

validation

by

consumer capital cannot be underestimated. They force recognition of
a spectrum of difference and variation rather than a binary between
abled and disabled which is key to our challenge to the enhancement/
therapy distinction. Vivian Sobchack has described her experience of
having a prosthetic leg in just these terms. She says:
Here with Aimee Mullins’s legs (both onscreen and off), we have
both – and simultaneously – incorporation and projection, an
overcoming and a resistance, an unstoppable ‘difference’ that is
not about negation but about the alterity of becoming. . ..As for
me, despite my awe and admiration for Mullins. . .I

have

no

desire to keep pace with her. . .all [I want is] to be able to walk to
work, to the store and maybe on a treadmill at the gym. . . so
I can get about my world with the minimum of prosthetic
thought.40
What then is the ‘normal’ body from which all enhancements and
therapies are to be benchmarked? Garland-Thomson argues that the
so-called ‘natural’ body—that which is unmodified by medical
intervention in this modern day consumerist universe—is no longer the

normal body but rather the modified body is portrayed as normal in
its most ideal state. Referring to cosmetic surgery, she says:
The beautiful woman of the twenty-first century is sculpted from
top to bottom, generically neutral, all irregularities regularised,
all particularities expunged. She is thus nondisabled, deracialised
and de-ethnicised.41

We need to be careful here, however, to distinguish beauty from
normalcy. The beautiful woman to whom Garland-Thomson refers is
one who has been regularised or normalised. Standards of beauty as
ideal, however, are typically not regular nor normal. Supermodels
such as Kate Moss, Sophie Dahl, Gemma Ward and Agyness Deyn,
to name a few, are not ordinary or regular by any stretch of the
imagination. Gemma Ward, for instance, has been described as alien in
appearance.42 Normative embodiment, created through cosmetic body
modification practices, takes the place of ‘natural’ embodiment by
allowing more people to access the same point on the bell curve.43
This demonstrates Garland-Thomson’s third (and perhaps most
important for our purposes) aspect of disability, i.e. it is social
practices that construct abled and disabled embodiment. These social
practices also construct ideas of super-ability and enhancement.
Sports enhancement is a potent example of how the desire to alter
human biology is inextricably tied to existing social structures.
Arguably, athletic excellence only takes on meaning in a field with

definite rules and measurable standards.44 Oscar Pistorius, a doubleamputee sprinter, demonstrates this argument. Pistorius argued
recently before the International Olympic Committee that he should
be eligible to compete in the able-bodied Olympics using his
prosthetic limbs. Initially, Pistorius’s request was denied. It was
argued that his prosthetic limbs would give him an unfair
advantage over runners competing with non-prosthetic legs. Rather
than bring him up to the norm, it was suggested that Pistorius’s
prosthetic legs would enhance his capacity to run. The prosthetic legs, it
is argued, make him taller and give him a longer stride than he would
have had with his natural legs, thereby giving him an unfair advantage
when using them to compete against those without such prosthetics. As
Jeré Longman of the New York Times described:

Pistorius wants to be the first amputee runner to compete in the
Olympics. But despite his ascendance, he is facing resistance from
track and field’s world governing body, which is seeking to bar him
on the grounds that the technology of his prosthetics may give him an
unfair advantage over sprinters using their natural legs.45

In 2007, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)
prohibited the use of ‘any technical device that incorporates springs,
wheels or any other element that provides a user with an advantage
over another athlete not using such a device’.46 It was thought that this

would exclude runners such as Pistorius from competing with the socalled able-bodied athletes.47 In May 2008, however, the Court of
Arbitration for Sport ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that Pistorius’ flexible prosthetic legs gave him an advantage.48 But the
issue is not just one of advantage but of an ‘unfair’ advantage. Critiques
of enhancement aids in the context of athletic performance typically rely
upon two claims: first, that achievement has not been earned and
secondly, that the use of aids is unfair because not all athletes have
equal access to them.49 But, can these arguments be sustained in the
case of Oscar Pistorius? Is the benefit he gets from his prosthetic legs an
unearned advantage? The argument about equal access to prosthetic legs
is alarming in its implications—that other runners should remove their
‘natural’ legs and don prosthetic legs like his in order to compete
with him. But, short of this, what can Pistorius do? While other sprinters
can experiment with high-tech shoes, and wear friction-free fibre, utilise
computer-aided training techniques, imbibe nutritional supplements, and
work out highly technical chemically balanced diets, it seems highly
questionable to position the fault line between the acceptable and the
unacceptable at Oscar’s
enhancement

failing

to

legs.

Here,

we

see

the

concept

of

adequately manage the complex relation

between the contemporary highly technologised and always already
modified but so-called ‘natural’ body and the enhanced/modified socalled disabled body.50
Garland-Thomson’s fourth aspect of disability, the instability of the

embodied self, has been dealt with extensively earlier. However, in
relation to Mullins, it is worth considering her capacity to actually
transform herself from fashion model to champion runner. It is
important to remember at this point that questioning the constitution of
the category normal does not just involve including within it those
of us who are deficient, it also requires attention to categories of
excess or excellence. Lennard Davis suggests that the disabled are
deviants because they represent an extreme end of the curve.
However, he does not go on to address the possibility that those
identified as disabled might simultaneously occupy both ends of the
curve at once. Aimee Mullins does this in that she is both disabled
and a super-model, an amputee and a champion sprinter.
In the context of disability, technologies that add to or modify the
body recast the idea of enhancement as enabling transgressive and
subversive embodied

possibilities

rather

than

simply

pushing

normativist ableist ideology.
In Aimee Mullins’s case, it is unlikely on the basis of her enhanced
disability (note it is not enhanced normativity) that it would be
accepted that the little girl in the ad should have her legs removed and
replaced with prostheses. The problem is that for the superabled
disabled person, they still have no foothold in normativity. Rather
they go from disability to super-ability without ever stopping at
normal and therefore without being able to lay claim to that status.
It is worth recalling Scully and Rehmann-Sutter’s analysis of disabled

embodiment as leading to an exclusion from the category of the
‘naturally human’.51 Here, however, the individual is simultaneously
‘disabled’ and enabled.52 Surprisingly, this does not seem to
neutralise the categorisation of the individual as disabled but rather
leads to their reclassification as unnaturally human and still therefore
excluded from the normative humanity.
Wolbring argues that uses of enhancement technologies aimed at
disability are in fact concerned
consequences

of

an

‘ability

with

selection

selecting
or

for ability. The

disability

de-selection

sentiment’ in his view are that it will undermine a ‘social justice view of
disability.’ He goes on:

And it will become the morally responsible way of acting. Where
does the reality of this debate leave disabled people? Stuck with
the medical/transhumanist model of disability. Where does it
leave society? In an ability rat race. Ability to perform better.
Ability to make more money. Ability to win commercial
competitions. . .53
However, ability built on disability may not necessarily result in an
upwards ‘normative creep’ as Wolbring suggests. He says if we take
the transhumanist disability model:
the ‘disabled’ (mM) of today will set the new norm (normative
creep) after they were ‘fixed’ above the old norm (becoming the

new ‘non-disabled’ (sM)) and the ‘non-disabled’ (sM) of today
will be seen as the new ‘disabled’ (mM).54
This may be, paradoxically, a far too utopian vision. If the effect of
enhancement technologies is to rewrite the content of the normative
categories,

then

the

concern

shifts

away from

the

technologies

themselves to the hierarchisation of the abled individuals to whom the
technologies are applied. Indeed, it is clear that the norm as a form
of average or ‘species typical functioning’ continues to persist. The flaw
in Wolbring’s account is that individuals can only occupy one status or
position in his typology at any one time whereas, in fact, to be both
disabled and enhanced or ‘superabled’ at the same time seems to leave
the normative untouched.
What we have been trying to do so far is challenge the standard upon
which the idea of enhancement is meant to make sense. Disability, we
have shown, is never just that. So, we come back to the question of
enhancement but this time understood as containing within it
everything we otherwise considered to be merely ‘treatment or
therapy’.

IV. THE THERAPY/ENHANCEMENT DISTINCTION AS
A GUIDE TO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING
The aim of this discussion so far has been to examine the sustainability
and efficacy, as a basis for ethical and medical decision-making, of a
distinction between those alterations to humans that might be

characterised as therapeutic and those that might be characterised as
enhancement. In this part of the article, we turn our attention to the
usefulness of this distinction for guiding legal limits. We focus on
laws that regulate the use and availability of PGD. Legal regimes utilise
the concept ‘serious disability’ as a benchmark for permissible
embryo testing using PGD. In most of the legislative instruments
regulating the use of PGD, ‘serious disability’ is not defined.
Overall, while it may appear that the therapy/enhancement distinction
has guided legal determinations about what to allow and what not
to allow, a closer look at the legislation of three jurisdictions
suggests both that it does not in fact do so and should not do so.
Regulations in Australia, Canada and the UK regarding the use and
availability of PGD are currently undergoing intense scrutiny and
development. PGD is used to detect embryos with genetic anomalies
and to avoid their development. Typically, only those embryos that do
not test positively for the specific genetic anomaly being investigated are
considered suitable and selected for implantation in the woman’s
uterus. Were the legislation to be relaxed and should the technology
become refined it might be possible in the future to select embryos
that tested positive for traits such as intelligence and athletic ability.
Positioned outside of this continuum is what Karpin has coined
‘negative enhancement’55 where a parent selects in favour of a trait
commonly associated with a disability. In the context of in vitro
fertilisation and assisted reproduction, as well as through the use of

PGD, some individuals have sought to create and/or select embryos
with certain traits that the majority of the community might consider
undesirable such as deafness or dwarfism.56 This suggests that at some
future time if it is possible legally and medically that selections may
be made not only to achieve traits that the majority of the community
perceives to be normal or better than normal but also to achieve traits a
niche group perceives as desirable and ‘normal’ for them, though not
typical. What then is the role of law and how should we determine
where to draw the legal lines?57
Canada has not yet promulgated regulations with respect to PGD.
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) Act prohibits a
number of practices while establishing a regulatory framework for
those reproductive practices that are permissible pursuant to license.
With respect to the regulation of PGD, the AHR Act prohibits sex
selection except to prevent, treat or diagnose a sex-linked disease or
disorder (section 5(e)). In addition, PGD will be governed by the
AHR Act pursuant to those sections of the legislation and forthcoming
regulations that deal with the collection, alteration, manipulation or
treatment of any human reproductive material for the purpose of
creating an embryo (sections 10(1) and 10(2)).
While PGD is being carried out in a limited way, and in a regulatory
vacuum, in Canada, two publications of the Government of Canada
have identified some of the policy debates raised by this issue. The first
is a consultation document of the Health Canada Assisted Reproduction

Office, Issues Related to the Regulation of Pre-Implantation Genetic
Diagnosis Under the Assisted Human Reproduction Act58 and the
second is a publication of the Canadian Biotechnology Secretariat,
Brave New World: Where Biotechnology and Human Rights Intersect.59
In its consultation document, Health Canada distinguishes between
the use of PGD for ‘medical/health reasons’ and its use for ‘non-health
related traits such as hair or eye colour’.60 They cite the ‘serious
condition’ standard as a limitation on the use of PGD about which
there is

some

agreement,

but

acknowledge

that

it

would

be

‘difficult to define’ and that ‘there are many complex factors
that need to be accounted for in this definition’.61 Moreover, as the
Brave New World report points out, access to PGD in Canada ‘is
currently controlled by the medical profession’.62 Falling outside of
formal regulation, decisions relating to PGD are privately made by the
woman, or couple, with her doctor.63 Since there are no regulations
or guidelines about what a ‘serious’ condition is, this determination
falls to the clinicians involved. In
against

serious

disorders

is

Australia,

therapeutic

selection

not only allowed but facilitated

by

regulations and guidelines that allow the use of PGD to screen to
avoid transmission of these conditions. At the federal level, the National
Health and Medical Research Council’s Ethical Guidelines on the
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and
Research (NHMRC ART) provide guidance on the circumstances in

which

it would

be

appropriate

to

use

PGD.64 A number of the

States have specific legislation governing assisted reproductive technology
services. While these regulatory instruments do set up systems for the
governance of the provision of PGD in those States, the NHMRC ART
nevertheless applies to all States and Territories, because compliance
with the guidelines is necessary for an IVF clinic to obtain
accreditation. All IVF providers are required by the Reproductive
Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC) to comply with the
guidelines.65 The NHMRC ART guidelines set down specific
recommendations in regards to the provision of PGD. Clause 12.1 of the
guidelines reads:
PGD is currently used to detect serious genetic conditions, to
improve ART outcomes and, in rare circumstances, to select an
embryo with compatible tissue for a sibling. These uses have
profound ethical significance including:
•

what counts as a serious genetic condition is controversial;

•

there are different perceptions of disability;

•

the practice of selecting against some forms of abnormality
may threaten the status and equality of opportunity of
people who have that form of abnormality;

• the procedures involve the disposal of some healthy embryos;
and
• the procedures have technical limitations (such as the failure

to identify the genetic abnormality of interest)
Clinics must ensure careful evaluation of these and all other
relevant issues before the use of PGD.66
These guidelines complicate the idea of disability and the significance of its
consequences. Moreover, they demonstrate how difficult it is to rely upon
the therapy/enhancement distinction to sort out what should and should
not be prohibited. The resort to the language of abnormality presupposes
a highly contestable shared assumption about what is in fact normal.
Clause 12.2 of the guidelines recommends against allowing selection
for prevention of conditions that do not seriously harm the person to be
born; selection of the sex of an embryo except to reduce the risk of
transmission of a serious genetic condition; or selection in favour of a
genetic defect or disability in the person to be born. Clause 12.2 clearly
relies on a shared understanding of disability that has been discounted
in clause
12.1. Moreover, the application of a therapy/enhancement distinction is
instantiated despite the category of disability itself having been
critiqued in the previous clause.
ART Clinics too produce ethical guidelines. These documents provide
a resource for understanding what counts as a disability in the clinical
context. For instance, Sydney IVF’s guidelines67 clearly state that
selection against traits not associated with disease and selection for
disease or disability traits is regarded as inappropriate. While there is

no specific statement regarding what might be a disability or disease
trait, we get a clue from the statement below:
While there are genetically based traits that could be perceived as
advantageous or disadvantageous, such advantage or disadvantage
is likely to be circumstantial and unpredictable. Were it possible to
use IVF with PGD to produce a child free of a familial trait that is
not obviously associated with disease or disability, it would be
unwise to do so to avoid an outcome that, with a level of parental
respect and love that any child should be able to expect to receive,
would not be a clinically important concern to the child.68
Sydney IVF makes the standard a disease or disability of ‘clinical’, rather
than social, importance. In these circumstances clinical can be
understood to refer to those diseases or disabilities that would require
treatment in the clinic. Since all of us require treatment in the
clinic at some point, it is clear that what is being referred to here must
be something more significant that minor ailments or indeed minor
disabilities. Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, each has
a different set of criteria to determine when a disability is significant
enough to allow it to be avoided via PGD. In all these States, the
regulatory regime is vague and the best way to determine what is a
disability significant enough to allow PGD is to work in reverse by
looking at the conditions for which

testing

These range from single-gene disorders

has

(e.g.

been

cystic

approved.69
fibrosis)

or

chromosomal disorders70 such as Trisomy 18, to ‘Autosomal recessive
conditions where it is proposed to identify and select against carrier
embryos in addition to testing for the condition’.71 The inclusion of
carrier embryos is particularly significant because it further tests and
questions the usefulness of the therapy/ enhancement distinction. Is it
therapy to improve your child’s future reproductive potential by ensuring
that they will not have to face an adverse reproductive decision when
they decide to have children because they carry the gene for a disease or
disability that may be passed on?
Selection in favour of a disability is prohibited whether by virtue of
the policies of the State-specific regulatory bodies or by compliance
with the NHMRC ART Guidelines.72 In Victoria, the Infertility Treatment
Authority (ITA) has issued a policy on the use of PGD that includes a
prohibition on the use of PGD for selection in favour of a disability.
While Victorian legislation does not prohibit such a practice, the ITA
considers ‘selection in favour of genetic disease or abnormality’
‘inconsistent’ with the first guiding principle of the Act73 (that ‘the
welfare and interests of any person. . .to be born. . .are paramount’).74
Furthermore,

the

compliance with

the

NHMRC ART

Guidelines

forms one of the licence conditions for ART centres,75 thereby excluding
selection in favour of disability. In Western Australia, neither the
legislation nor the Reproductive Technology Council’s policy on PGD
explicitly contemplates the use of PGD for selection in favour of a
disability. Nonetheless, a condition of every Western Australian licence

is accreditation with the RTAC, which, in turn, requires compliance with
the NHMRC ART Guidelines.
In the UK, PGD is regulated pursuant to the issuing of a license by the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). While the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) (unamended)
does not explicitly address the issue of PGD, under its current Code
of Practice,76 the HFEA does provide guidance for the use of PGD and
states:
The use of PGD should be considered only where there is a
significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present in the
embryo. The perception of the level of risk by those seeking
treatment is an important factor in the decision making process.
The seriousness of the condition should be a matter for discussion
between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team
(emphasis added).77
Section G12.3.3 of the Code of Practice lists the factors that should be
considered in making the decision to screen for a particular disability:
(a) the view of the people seeking treatment of the condition to be
avoided;
(b) their previous reproductive experience;
(c) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition; and
(d) the availability of effective therapy, now and in the future; and
(e) the speed of degeneration in progressive disorders; and

(f) the extent of any intellectual impairment; and
(g) the extent of social support available; and
(h) the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment.78
In this way the HFEA appears to encourage contextualisation, which
raises

again

the

argument

that

disability

and

co-extensively

enhancement are fluid and unsustainable as meaningful criteria for
determining the regulatory limits of the use of PGD.79
At the time of writing, a Bill has been presented to the UK Parliament,
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007. Under this
amending Bill, a new provision specifically dealing with genetic
testing of embryos is to be inserted into Schedule 2 of the Act,
paragraph 1ZA, which prohibits the testing of an embryo except in
specified circumstances. Those cases are: where there is a particular
risk that

the

mitochondrion
abnormality

embryo may have any
abnormality,

or

any

establishing

gene,
whether

chromosome
it

has

or
that

other gene, chromosome or mitochondrion

abnormality; where the authority is satisfied that in ‘relation to the
abnormality of which there is a particular risk’, and ‘any other
abnormality for which testing is to be authorised under sub-paragraph
(1)(b) that there is a significant risk

that

a person with the

abnormality will have or develop a serious physical or mental
disability, a serious illness or any other serious medical condition’.
The current policy of the HFEA therefore appears to be preserved

under the proposed amendments of the Bill—to test using PGD,
there must be a significant risk of a serious physical/mental
disability/illness/medical condition.
In addition, the proposed HFE amendments contain an explicit
prohibition on the use of PGD to select in favour of a disability.
Clause 14 of the HFE Bill proposes a new subsection 13(9), which
prohibits ‘preferring’ those ‘embryos. . . known to have a gene,
chromosome or

mitochondrion abnormality’ above those ‘not

known to have such an abnormality’.80 As the Explanatory Notes
emphasise, this new licence condition prevents ‘similar situations to
cases, outside the UK, where positive selection of deaf donors in
order deliberately to result in a deaf child have been reported’.81
The legislative attempts to regulate the uses of PGD in Australia and
the UK rely (in part) upon a concept of serious condition or disability as
the condition precedent for authorising the use of genetic testing of the
embryo. Implicit in this standard is a concern about curtailing the use of
PGD to design or tailor the characteristics of one’s progeny, indeed to
use PGD to screen for certain desired and desirable characteristics or
traits. By confining the use of PGD to testing for serious conditions or
disabilities, its status as a therapeutic technique is sought to be preserved.
In

this

way,

an

ethical

distinction

between

therapeutic

and

nontherapeutic selection (enhancement) has been written into the law by
using ‘serious disability’ as the benchmark. However, the legislated
use of the language of ‘abnormality’ in the UK and Australian legislation

clearly suggests a stable and knowable norm against which these
determinations can be made. As we have argued though, the concept of
normal embodiment is unsustainable as both a material fact and
normative goal. The prohibition of favouring an affected embryo, while not
legislating directly with respect to enhancement, clearly posits a
normative standard below which (rather than above which) it is not
possible to ‘design’. We conclude therefore by challenging the
appropriateness of imposing a system of regulatory constraints such as
those described above on these technologies which enable or constrain
alteration by means of selection given their reliance on assumptions
about the meaning of disability, abnormality and normalcy and the corelated reliance on an unsustainable distinction between

therapy and

enhancement to offer ethical, medical and regulatory limits.
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